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1. Introduction 
In Austria the share of immigrants in the population amounts to 19 percent in 2012 and is 
one of the largest in the OECD. In international comparison general labor market integration 
outcomes are not unfavorable (see e.g. Krause and Liebig 2011). However, empirical 
evidence shows disadvantages of immigrants with respect to employment, unemployment, 
job offers and position in the occupational hierarchy (see e.g. Huber 2010, Liebig and Krause 
2011, Titelbach et al. 2013, Weichselbaumer 2013). In this paper, we will analyze wage 
differentials between immigrants and natives for Austria in a systematic way, using matched 
data from labor force surveys and administrative social security data.  
One can define discrimination as unequal treatment that disfavors immigrants against 
natives. Taste-based and statistical discrimination has been distinguished in the economic 
literature (see Becker 1957, Arrow, 1973). While the former relates to unequal treatment due 
to preferences of economic agents, the latter derives unequal treatment from incomplete 
knowledge about the true productivity of workers which may lead to stereotyping behavior. In 
the following empirical analysis, we will contrast two basic principles of equal treatment: 
“equal pay for equal endowments” versus “equal pay for equal work”. The first principle 
implements a broader definition of discrimination: wage differentials which cannot be 
explained by typical (observable) productivity characteristics, like education and training are 
labelled discrimination. The second principle implements a definition of discrimination which 
is narrower. Wage differentials due to different job characteristics, like industry, occupation 
or hierarchical position in a firm are taken out: only inexplicable wage differentials for natives 
and immigrants in the same jobs are defined as discrimination. This definition does not take 
into account how the workers got this job.  
For Austria – with the exception of Grandner and Gstach (2014) - almost no research exists 
on this topic due to data limitations. In our empirical analysis we first use Oaxaca-Blinder 
decomposition techniques to determine wage differentials at the mean of the distribution. 
Moreover, we apply quantile decomposition techniques to analyze the heterogeneity of 
discrimination and human capital effects across the wage distribution. Finally, we test the 
wage assimilation hypothesis for Austria. 
In other countries, wage discrimination against immigrants has been extensively analyzed in 
recent years (see e.g. OECD 2013 for a review). The early wage assimilation hypothesis by 
Barry Chiswick (1978) for the United States suggests that immigrants close the initial wage 
gap with natives within 10 to 15 years, and then they may overtake due to the very high 
wage growth. The original results by Chiswick of an overtaking of the immigrants are based 
on cross-sectional data. Longitudinal data, where immigrants could be tracked over time, 
show indeed a catch up, but not an overtaking of immigrants anymore in relation to 
individuals who were born in the United States (Borjas 1985). 
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In European countries, wage differentials between natives and immigrants are less 
frequently analyzed. For the United Kingdom, Elliot and Lindley (2008) show a wage 
differential of about 16 percent among white British men and non-white immigrants, this 
differential cannot be explained by differences in productivity. Bell (1997) finds no wage 
disadvantage for white immigrants. However, black immigrants who spent a greater part of 
their career abroad face wage disadvantages. Dustmann et al. (2010) again demonstrate 
that immigrants from OECD countries have higher wages as natives in the UK. 
For Germany Lehmer and Ludsteck (2011) show that most immigrant groups have 20 
percent lower wages than native Germans. The differences are largest for Poles and 
smallest for the Spanish. The result of an Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition shows that 
approximately half of the differential is explained by differences in productivity. Controlling for 
occupation lowers the unexplained part by 20-30 percent. Hirsch and Jahn (2012) show that 
about 14 to 17 percentage points of this 20 percentage point wage differential can be 
explained by observable productivity characteristics (including occupation). Beblo et al. 
(2012) report a difference in wages between Germans and foreign workers of approximately 
15.5 percent for the period 1996 to 2007. They find strong evidence that foreign workers are 
employed disproportionately often in low-wage firms. Controlling for these firm effects 
reduces the wage differential to 10.6 percent of which about 8 percentage points can be 
explained by observable productivity characteristics such as education, work experience and 
tenure. Moreover, Licht and Steiner (1993) find no evidence for the assimilation hypothesis 
in Germany. 
For Denmark, Nielsen et al. (2004) find a higher wage differential between foreigners and 
natives for men than for women. Males from Turkey, Africa and Pakistan earn 22 percent, 23 
percent, and 26 percent, respectively, less than natives. The wage penalty for female 
immigrants from these countries amounts to 17 percent. In an Oaxaca-Blinder 
decomposition including the standard human capital variables, occupation and hierarchical 
job position as productivity measures, nearly the full differential is explained for males. For 
women approximately one third of the differential remains unexplained. In the case of Spain, 
Canal-Dominguez et al. (2008) find wage differentials of nearly 40% of which three quarters 
can be explained by differences in productivity (including job position). 
Several studies analyze the gender wage differential in Austria empirically (see e.g. Winter-
Ebmer and Zweimüller, 1994, Böheim et al. 2013); however, empirical evidence on wage 
differentials by nationality or migration status is very scarce. In a first study, Grandner and 
Gstach (2014) use the EU-SILC data for the analysis of wage discrimination between 
immigrants and natives for Austria. They report a wage penalty in the range of 15 to 25 
percent. They use counterfactual densities to decompose the wage differential and report a 
discrimination component ranging from 5 to 20 percentage points. The discrimination 
component follows a marked U-shape over the income distribution reaching a maximum at 
around the 8th decile. While Grandner and Gstach (2014) use comparable EU survey data 
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from a relatively small sample, we can profit from the combination of comprehensive 
administrative with high-quality labor force data. We consider wage differentials between 
natives and immigrants for male and female separately to avoid problems with gender wage 
differentials.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section presents the methods 
we use to analyze wage discrimination. Section 3 deals with a description of our data source 
and presents basic information on differences in characteristics between immigrants and 
natives. Section 4 discusses the econometric results. The final section concludes. 
2. Methods to measure discrimination 
In this paper wage differentials between natives and immigrants are analyzed by 
decomposition methods (see Fortin et al., 2011 for a general overview). The Oaxaca-Blinder 
(OB) approach decomposes the wage gap of natives and immigrants in a component due to 
differences in productivity-related characteristics and a so-called residual term 
("discrimination component").1 This method splits up the average wage gap. This mean 
decomposition result is only representative if the coefficients do not vary across the wage 
distribution. We use a quantile regression framework to investigate differential effects across 
the wage distribution. Finally, we apply simple regression analysis to test the wage 
assimilation hypothesis for Austria. 
The Oaxaca-Blinder method is used to decompose the average wage differential between 
natives (I) and foreigners (A) in a productivity-related difference (E) and a so-called 
discrimination component (U). 
ln  −		 =  + 	 
The starting point is the so called Mincer wage equation which is estimated for each of the 
two groups separately. The log hourly wage is a linear function of a variety of individual and 
firm level characteristics, e. g. education, work experience, job tenure, firm size, industry. 
The coefficient vector ß reflects the price of the individual characteristics, such as the wage 
effect of an additional year of schooling. 
ln = 	ß	 +	 and ln	 = 	ß			 + 		 are the Mincer wage equations for both of the 
groups. It follows that ln  −		 =	ß  - ß	 	. Let’s assume that a non-discriminatory 
coefficient vector ß* exists. Then the average wage gap can be decomposed in the following 
way: 
                                                     
1
 See Weichselbaumer and Winter-Ebmer (2005) for the rhetoric in the use of “discrimination” or “unexplained 
residual” in gender research.  
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ln  −		 =  - 		ß
∗ + [	ß-ß
∗+			ß
∗ − ß	] 
The first term E =  - 		ß∗	represents the share of the average wage gap which is due to 
the different endowments of the two groups with productivity-related characteristics. U = 
	ß-ß
∗+			ß
∗ − ß	 represents the unexplained residual or the discrimination 
component. It should be noted that this part also includes all unobservable differences 
between the groups. 
The decomposition used requires an estimate of the non-discriminatory wage structure ß∗. 
We assume that the wage structure of the natives is non-discriminatory2. Substituting ß	 as 
an estimate of ß∗	 results in the following simple decomposition into E and U: 
ln  −		 =  - 		ß +			ß-ß	 
Again, the first factor represents the portion of the wage gap that is due to differences in 
endowments, while the second part represents the unexplained residual. 
After the analysis of the mean wage gap we use quantile regressions (QR) to analyze the 
wage differentials at different points of the wage distribution. QR models specify the qth 
conditional quantile of the log wage distribution as a linear function of the explanatory 
variables (see Koenker and Hallock 2001 for an introduction): 
ln  =	ß	 +	,   i=I,	A, 
with  ∈ 0,1 and E[|]=0. In contrast to OLS regressions, QR do not have the property 
that the mean value of the dependent variable and the means of the explanatory variables lie 
on the regression line. As a consequence, a simple OB decomposition is not possible. 
Following the literature (e.g. Böheim et al. 2013, Lehmer and Ludsteck 2011) we use the 
method of Melly (2006) to estimate counterfactual wage distributions. 
In a first step, the conditional wage distribution is estimated by QR. In a second step, the 
conditional distribution over the range of the explanatory variables is integrated out, thereby 
obtaining an estimator for the unconditional wage distribution. Based on the distribution of 
characteristics of the foreigners and the coefficients that result from the estimate with the 
data of the natives, we obtain the counterfactual distribution that would result if foreigners 
would achieve the same returns on their productivity-relevant characteristics as natives. For 
each quantile the wage differential between native and foreigners can be decomposed into 
two parts. The first (explained) part is due to differences in the distribution of productivity-
                                                     
2
 Due to the relatively small number of immigrants, it is less sensible to assume the foreigner’s wage structure to be 
the non-discriminatory one; therefore, the usual index number problem in decomposition analysis does not apply 
here. 
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relevant characteristics. The second component (discrimination) reflects differences in the 
returns to characteristics. 
The validity of such a decomposition depends on the selection of explanatory variables in the 
wage function. If one selects too many control variables, discrimination could be 
underestimated. This can be illustrated with an example from the gender discrimination 
research. If there is a so-called glass ceiling and women are not promoted to top positions, 
then a regression with a control variable “occupational rank” would underestimate 
discrimination as this variable would represent an endogenous variable. If one assumes 
instead a narrower concept of discrimination, i.e. one considers only wage differentials 
between persons with the same human capital and similar occupational ranks, than the 
control variable is justified. Lehmer and Ludsteck (2011) discuss this problem with respect to 
occupation dummies. If the selection into occupations depends only on productive 
characteristics, which may not be visible to the researcher but are, in fact, observable by the 
employer (e. g. imperfect transferability of human capital acquired in foreign countries, 
insufficient languages skills), occupational dummies are justified. On the other hand if 
assignment to occupations is governed by discriminatory preferences of employers, the 
inclusion of occupational dummies masks discrimination.  
To provide bounds according to these two views, we use two different specifications of the 
wage function. Specification I is based on a broader definition of discrimination. In this 
specification education, work experience, job tenure, employment days in the Austrian labor 
market within the last 5 years, firm size, marital status, number of children, level of 
urbanization and region are included in the wage equation as explanatory variables. We 
include also, in addition to that, dummies for industry, occupation (vertical segregation), 
hierarchical position (horizontal segregation) and blue-white-collar (specification II). The 
equations are estimated separately for men and women, respectively, using OLS. 
These two specifications ideally correspond to two different concepts of discrimination. 
Specification II is based on the principle of "equal pay for equal work": Ideally, we want to 
control for the type of job, the occupational hierarchy etc.: this concept makes a comparison 
between two employees (of different nationalities) at the same job. It does not matter how 
these two people came into this job. Note however, that the allocation of jobs, career 
advancement etc. may already have been characterized by unequal treatment. 
The measure of overall discrimination in the labor market could therefore have been 
underestimated. Specification I defines discrimination as "equal pay for equal endowments": 
as only productivity features are used as explanatory factors, but no features of the job.3 This 
level of discrimination may represent an overestimation of discrimination because some 
                                                     
3
 “Ideally” here means that in the above mentioned case not all job-relevant characteristics and not all productivity-
relevant characteristics may be measurable. 
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productivity-relevant characteristics of the workers may not be exactly measured and they 
could possibly affect wages through job allocation. These two issues of the measurement of 
discrimination provide a common area of discussion which occurs in similar ways in the 
gender pay gap discussion. In this field the glass ceiling with respect to promotions and the 
choice or assignment of women to typical low-paid women's jobs are major research topics. 
3. Data 
We combine the Austrian micro-census (labor force survey) with data from social security 
records. The data set was matched at the individual level. For reasons of data protection, the 
matching was done by Statistics Austria and the econometric estimations were carried out in 
the safe center of Statistics Austria. The merged data contain human capital variables, such 
as education and experience, workplace characteristics and complete working history since 
1988. The sample size corresponds to the number of observations in the micro-census.  
The Austrian micro-census is a quarterly panel survey which collects information on private 
households. It is representative of the Austrian population and contains information of about 
80,000 individuals per year. Every quarter a fifth of the sample is renewed. The micro-census 
served as the central data source for the study. Since valid statements for different migrant 
groups require an adequate sample size, the micro-censuses of the years 2008 to 2010 
were pooled and the data of the second quarter was used. The micro-census was used to 
get information on personal (sex, age, nationality, migration background) and labor market 
characteristics (occupation, current employment status, working hours, industry, and job 
position). The indicator for the job position depends on skill requirements and occupation. 
We differentiate between the following job positions (elementary occupation; minor skills 
requirements; medium skills required; high skills required; advanced skills required and 
leading manager in large firms). The data from the micro-census are supplemented with 
information from the labor market database which is based on social security registers.  
The data about income of the Federation of Austrian Social Insurance (contribution bases) 
are used for the mean wage gap analysis because information is available for 2008-2010. In 
addition to the income data, employment days within a year, job tenure and firm size have 
been taken from the labor market data base. Furthermore, an indicator of the employment 
days in Austria within the last five years was constructed. Based on the annual income in the 
respective firm, the associated employment days and the standard working hours according 
to the micro-census, gross hourly wages were calculated as an indicator of the salary. The 
analysis of the effects across the wage distribution is undertaken with income data from the 
micro-census. The income information of the micro census 2009 and 2010 is based on wage 
8 
tax records data (Baierl et al. 2011) and is not censored at the maximum contribution celling. 
4
 Net hourly wages are used as the dependent variable. 
Our estimation sample consists of full-time employed workers aged 20 to 55 who were active 
in the years 2008-2010 in the private sector of the Austrian economy. For the respective 
employment in the second quarter of each year, the hourly wage was calculated and deflated 
to prices of 2006. Only workers who were employed at least 270 days in their companies 
were included. 5  
Migration status is based on the concept of migration background. People with a migration 
background are defined as persons whose parents were both born abroad. This migrant 
group can be divided in the first generation (country of birth abroad) and the second 
generation (country of birth is Austria). The use of this concept has some advantages 
compared to a definition by nationality. For example, a change of citizenship does not cause 
a selection problem and for immigrants of second generation the problems of unobservable 
characteristics (language capabilities, quality of school education abroad) do not matter. 
In Table 1Table 1 summary statistics for natives and immigrants are shown. Hourly wages of 
immigrants are about 15 percent lower than those of the natives. However, it also becomes 
apparent that natives and immigrants differ in their productivity-related characteristics. One 
of the most important determinants of wages is the amount of formal schooling. Immigrants 
have on average half a year less years of education. Also job tenure is considerably shorter. 
Immigrants live more often in large cities and in the provinces of Vienna and Vorarlberg. With 
respect to industry the share of immigrants is above average in manufacturing and in the 
tourism sector. Significant differences are also apparent in occupation and job position. On 
average, immigrants have a higher probability to work in low wage occupations and less 
favorable job positions. Three quarters of male and slightly more than half of female 
immigrants are blue-collar workers. For Austrians, the corresponding proportions are 43 
percent and 17 percent, respectively. One out of five (three) migrant males (females) work in 
elementary occupations. For Austrians this applies only to three to four percent. These data 
show considerable heterogeneity between natives and immigrants with respect to human 
capital and job positions.  
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 Only in the highest 1% of income, the actual values are replaced by the median of these groups (Baierl et al 
.2011). 
5
 Following Böheim et al. (2013b) this limitation was used to eliminate short-term employment or seasonal 
employment episodes. Foreigners are found with a higher probability in less stable or in seasonal jobs. We redid the 
analysis with a minimum employment period of 60 days: approximately the same results arise. 
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics:  natives and immigrants 
 Men Women 
 
 
Natives 
 
Migrants 
1st gen. 
Migrants 
2nd gen. Natives 
Migrants 
1st gen. 
Migrants 
2nd gen. 
Gross hourly wage (in Euros) 11.2 9.6 11.0 9.5 7.9 8.5 
Education (in years) 11.8 11.3 11.3 12.1 11.6 11.6 
Tenure (in years) 11.1 7.4 9.5 9.8 7.6 7.7 
Experience (in years) 20.6 21.6 17.7 19.6 22.9 16.3 
Employed in Austria (share in last 
5 years) 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.8 0.8 
Married 79.0 85.5 80.7 63.3 73.3 67.6 
Single 21.0 14.5 19.3 36.7 26.7 32.4 
Blue-collar worker 43.1 73.7 47.6 16.6 53.7 27.0 
White-collar worker 56.9 26.3 52.4 83.4 46.3 73.0 
Number of children        
No children 31.5 28.5 31.2 49.4 38.7 36.0 
1 child 29.6 21.9 29.7 27.3 26.1 27.9 
2 children  29.5 30.9 30.5 17.6 26.3 24.3 
3 children + 9.5 18.7 8.6 5.7 9.0 11.7 
Firm size       
0-9 13.8 11.6 12.3 18.7 12.6 14.4 
10-19 8.1 8.9 7.1 8.3 6.4 9.0 
20-49 15.0 16.3 13.8 12.7 14.3 9.0 
50-499 40.4 43.4 40.9 34.7 39.5 36.9 
500+ 22.8 19.7 26.0 25.6 27.2 30.6 
City size       
0-10.000 70.7 36.0 42.4 61.1 34.3 35.1 
10.001-100.000 16.2 28.2 34.6 18.6 23.8 36.9 
100.000 +  13.2 35.7 23.0 20.3 41.9 27.9 
Federal State       
Burgenland 4.7 1.9 2.2 6.0 2.6 2.7 
Carinthia 10.2 6.4 2.6 10.8 5.1 5.4 
Lower Austria 11.7 11.7 9.3 10.9 8.5 7.2 
Upper Austria 15.7 13.5 8.9 12.0 11.6 16.2 
Salzburg 10.9 12.1 8.6 11.0 13.1 9.9 
Styria 13.3 6.1 3.7 12.7 4.9 2.7 
Tyrol 11.6 10.8 11.9 10.9 10.7 8.1 
Vorarlberg 9.8 16.5 34.6 8.9 14.0 27.9 
Vienna 12.2 21.0 18.2 16.8 29.6 19.8 
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Table 1Table 1 continued: Descriptive statistics: natives and immigrants 
 Men Women 
 
Natives Migrants 1st gen. 
Migrants 
2nd gen. Natives 
Migrants  
1st gen. 
Migrants 
2nd gen. 
Industry       
Primary production* 3.4 1.9 1.1 1.5 1.2 0.0 
Manufacturing 32.9 34.4 42.4 15.8 24.3 27.0 
Construction 14.5 18.5 9.7 3.0 1.1 0.9 
Trade 16.2 15.0 18.2 20.6 17.2 30.6 
Tourism 1.5 5.7 0.4 5.9 16.1 1.8 
Business services 19.8 17.0 21.9 21.4 15.5 15.3 
Public services 8.4 4.8 4.5 26.2 19.5 17.1 
Other services 3.3 2.8 1.9 5.5 5.1 7.2 
        
Occupation       
Managers 9.0 3.6 9.3 4.7 4.7 3.6 
Professionals 6.9 4.6 4.8 5.7 4.0 6.3 
Technicians 23.4 8.9 20.4 26.4 13.3 20.7 
Office employees 8.8 3.4 7.4 30.2 9.9 23.4 
Clerks 4.4 6.1 4.8 19.7 17.0 24.3 
Agricultural worker 0.7 0.8 0.0 0.8 0.4 0.0 
Craft workers 27.9 31.8 23.8 2.4 4.1 0.9 
Operators 11.0 16.0 14.9 2.1 6.1 4.5 
Elementary Occupations 7.8 24.8 14.5 8.0 40.5 16.2 
        
Job Position       
Unskilled 2.9 20.8 8.2 4.3 33.2 15.3 
Low skilled 17.9 35.2 21.2 12.9 25.6 12.6 
Medium skilled 47.0 30.8 42.0 53.8 25.7 55.0 
High skilled 15.8 4.6 13.4 16.4 6.7 8.1 
Advanced/leading 16.4 8.7 15.2 12.6 8.9 9.0 
N 11,137 1,598 269 5,110 802 111 
Source: Micro-census 2008-2010, AMDB 
* Primary production includes agriculture, forestry, mining and the energy sector 
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4. Results 
4.1. Wage differentials at the mean 
The descriptive evidence revealed marked differences in the endowments of natives and 
immigrants. We use the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition to explore the native-migrant wage 
gap. (Table 4Table 4 and Table 5Table 5 present the coefficients of the estimated wage 
equation.) According to Table 2Table 2, the raw wage gap between natives and immigrants 
amounts to 13.6 log percentage points for men and 17.2 log percentage points for women, 
respectively. The analysis shows that differences in human capital (education and 
experience) contribute significantly to the observed wage gap. Differences in human capital 
alone explain 30 percent of the wage gap for males, for women the share is slightly above 11 
percent (specification I). A detailed decomposition reveals that the unexplained gap is mainly 
related to lower returns to schooling and especially work experience of immigrants. 
Controlling for occupation and in particular job position (specification II) reduces the 
unexplained wage gap even further. The discrimination component falls to 3 (5) log 
percentage points for males (females).  
We find very different results for first and second generation immigrants. For the first 
generation the raw wage differential amounts to approximately 17 log percentage points. The 
raw wage differential for the immigrants of the second generation is considerably smaller 
(males 2, females 11 log percentage points). First generation immigrants are endowed with 
less human capital (schooling, tenure). These differences explain approximately one quarter 
of the raw wage differential of males, for females the share is only one tenth. Differences in 
occupation and in particular job position are even more important as human capital 
variables. According to specification II the unexplained part of the wage gap falls to 3.5 
(males) and 5.3 log percentage points (females), respectively. 
For male immigrants of second generation we only find a very small raw wage differential, 
which is not statistically significant. This small gap can be explained by the less favorable 
human capital endowment. Overall, there is no evidence for discrimination of male 
immigrants of second generation. The situation for female immigrants of second generation 
is different: their raw wage gap amounts to 10.6 log percentage points. Approximately one 
half of the raw wage differential can be explained by differences in human capital 
endowment (schooling, experience). Controlling for occupation and job position reduces the 
unexplained wage gap to 2.4 log percentage points. Note that the discrimination component 
is not statistically significant, which may also be due to the small sample size for migrants. 
The very low returns to experience for female second generation immigrants are striking. 
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Table 2: Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition  
 All Immigrants First generation Second generation 
Men    
Wage gap 
-0.136 -0.155 -0.023 
p-value (0.000) (0.000) (0.202) 
Specification I 
   
explained 
-0.040 -0.045 -0.018 
p-value (0.000) (0.000) (0.097) 
unexplained 
-0.095 -0.110 -0.005 
p-value (0.000) (0.000) (0.713) 
Specification II 
   
explained 
-0.107 -0.120 -0.034 
p-value (0.000) (0.000) (0.007) 
unexplained 
-0.029 -0.035 0.011 
p-value (0.000) (0.000) (0.421) 
N natives 11,140 11,140 11,140 
N immigrants 1,867 1,598 269 
Women    
Wage gap 
-0.172 -0.181 -0.106 
p-value (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
Specification I 
   
explained 
-0.020 -0.016 -0.049 
p-value (0.017) (0.074) (0.012) 
unexplained 
-0.152 -0.165 -0.057 
p-value (0.000) (0.000) (0.038) 
Specification II 
   
explained 
-0.122 -0.127 -0.083 
p-value (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
unexplained 
-0.050 -0.053 -0.024 
p-value (0.000) (0.000) (0.402) 
N natives 5,113 5,113 5,113 
N migrations 913 802 111 
Note: P-values for a test of the null hypothesis that the coefficient is not different from zero are presented in 
parentheses. 
A comparison of the returns to schooling between the first and second generation is 
interesting. The returns are comparatively low for the first generation immigrants. In contrast, 
male second generation immigrants earn the same returns as natives. The returns among 
women of the second generation remain slightly behind natives. This evidence indicates 
problems in the transferability of human capital which was acquired abroad. 
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4.2. Decompositions for the entire wage distribution 
The Oaxaca-Blinder approach splits up the wage gap at the average level. As unequal 
treatment may happen differently at different job or wage levels, we now turn to 
decompositions along the entire wage distribution using quantile regressions. We use net 
hourly wages as dependent variable and restrict the estimation period to 2009 and 2010. 
Due to the small number of cases a splitting up of the group of immigrants into first and 
second generation is not possible. 
Figure 1 shows the decomposition of wage differentials measured in log points, whereas 
Figure 2 concentrates on the discrimination components only. The discrimination component 
is shown here as share of total wage differential at the respective quantil of the distribution. 
99 quantile regressions were estimated, separately for each quantile of the wage distribution. 
It turns out that the wage disadvantage of immigrants’ increases with the wage level (see the 
blue graph "differential" in Figure 1). 6 At the bottom of the wage distribution it amounts to 8 
log percentage points for males and then rises steadily to almost 22 log percentage points. 
Only in the top decile it falls slightly. The increase in the wage gap is even steeper for 
females. For the 25th percentile it amounts to 13 log percentage points and then rises up to 
19 percentage points for the 90th percentile. In the highest income range, the wage gap is 
slightly smaller. Overall we find a considerable wage disadvantage for immigrants, in 
particular in the middle and upper part of the wage distribution. 
For men, the discrimination component increases with income (see Figure 2). Accordingly, 
40 percent of the wage gap can be explained by productivity-related characteristics at the 
10th percentile of the wage distribution (specification I). The discrimination share climbs up 
to around 90 percent at the 90th percentile. In the top decile the endowment differences in 
the productivity-related characteristics are smaller, so that almost the total wage differential 
must be attributed to discrimination. According to specification II no discrimination can be 
found at the bottom of the wage distribution (up to the 20th percentile), then the 
discrimination proportion rises to 40 percent (95th percentile). 
For females we find a somewhat different picture (specification I). Only at the very bottom of 
the wage distribution the unexplained wage gap is small, but then it rises steeply and is 
already around 85 percent at the 20th percentile. Afterwards the discrimination share 
remains constant. Specification II results in a very similar picture, however with a smaller 
discrimination component. In the lower third of the wage distribution the discrimination 
component increases markedly, than it flattens out. 
 
                                                     
6
 At the edge of the distribution (at the 1st, 2nd, or at the 98th, 99th percentile) the results should not be interpreted, 
because typically there is a low number of observations. 
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Figure 1: Decomposition of the wage differential 
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Figure 2: Discrimination component 
Decomposition of the wage differentials for men:  
share discrimination component 
 
Decomposition of the wage differentials for women: 
share discrimination component 
 
Overall, the migrant wage gap increases over the wage distribution. However, the 
unexplained wage gap differs across the wage distribution with respect to gender. For both 
groups and in the lowest part of the wage distribution, discrimination against immigrants is 
very low or even absent. For females the unexplained wage gap increases strongly with the 
wage. For men the discrimination component rises continuously but the level remains below 
that of women until the fourth quintile of the wage distribution. 
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4.3. Test of the assimilation hypothesis for Austria 
Finally, we turn to the question of wage assimilation in Austria. Especially in the American 
literature (Chiswick 1978, Borjas 1985) there is a discussion whether and when immigrants 
are able to close the wage gap with natives. We investigate this question for natives and first 
generation immigrants who migrated at the age of 15 or later. We differentiate between 
immigrants according to their length of stay in Austria. We estimate a similar wage function 
as above with the difference that now natives and immigrants are considered together, and 
use six dummies with respect to the length of stay times migration status (0-4 years, 5-10 
years, 11-15 years, 16-20 years, 21-25 years and over 25 years). 
Table 3Table 3 shows no evidence for wage assimilation in Austria. Irrespective of the length 
of stay, wage differentials are the same: most of the coefficients - which one can compare 
vertically in each column - are not statistically significantly different from each other. We only 
find very minor evidence for wage assimilation for females living more than 25 years in 
Austria. On the contrary we find no significant wage gaps for immigrants who immigrated 
recently (women specification II).  
Table 3: Assimilation hypothesis 
Immigrants x 
length of stay in 
Austria 
Men 
Specification I 
Men 
Specification II 
Women 
Specification I 
Women 
Specification II 
0-4 years -0.111 
(6.51) 
-0.019 
(1.27) 
-0.122 
(4.76) 
-0.040 
(1.76) 
5-10 years e -0.128 
(8.05) 
-0.043 
(2.95) 
-0.200 
(8.27) 
-0.067 
(3.09) 
11-15 years  -0.139 
(6.75) 
-0.058 
(3.11) 
-0.209 
(7.18) 
-0.096 
(3.74) 
16-20 years -0.150 
(13.75) 
-0.069 
(6.62) 
-0.239 
(13.95) 
-0.093 
(5.85) 
21-25 years -0.179 
(8.50) 
-0.080 
(4.15) 
-0.204 
(7.61) 
-0.080 
(3.38) 
>25 years -0.172 
(6.84) 
-0.092 
(4.02) 
-0.141 
(5.59) 
-0.036 
(1.62) 
Note: dependent variable: gross hourly wage (log); Specification I and II without share of employment in Austria in 
the last 5 years; italic numbers in brackets: t-statistics 
Analogous to the discussion between Borjas (1985) and Chiswick (1978) for the United 
States the problem of our analyses is that we cannot distinguish between assimilation and 
cohort effects because only cross-section data is available. The variable length of stay in 
Austria measures in addition to the length of stay also all the specific characteristics of the 
arrival cohort who came to Austria exactly x years ago. If the unobserved characteristics of 
these cohorts have changed over time this could also explain the estimated non-assimilation. 
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Table 4: Wage equation men and women: natives vs. immigrants, specification I 
 
Men Women 
 
Natives Immigrants Natives Immigrants 
Education 0.05414 0.04572 0.06728 0.05218 
  (42.41) (17.63) (37.62) (13.96) 
Tenure 0.00661 0.01167 0.00659 0.00956 
  (7.68) (4.74) (4.68) (2.57) 
Tenure2 0.00001 -0.00009 0.00007 0.00002 
  (0.56) (1.03) (1.55) (0.19) 
Experience 0.01588 0.01143 0.01872 0.00542 
  (14.01) (3.99) (12.72) (1.44) 
Experience2 -0.00030 -0.00032 -0.00037 -0.00017 
  (11.03) (4.74) (10.02) (1.90) 
Employment in Austria (5 years) 0.27396 0.18850 0.22563 0.09942 
  (15.76) (5.54) (10.77) (2.24) 
Single -0.04594 -0.00356 0.00393 0.03131 
  (7.38) (0.19) (0.54) (1.60) 
Firm size (Reference group: 0-9)         
10-19 0.04341 0.03353 0.07920 0.01813 
  (4.41) (1.37) (5.63) (0.45) 
20-49 0.06868 0.03426 0.09196 0.02204 
  (8.27) (1.61) (7.51) (0.68) 
50-499 0.12060 0.08934 0.12824 0.04526 
  (17.30) (4.90) (13.24) (1.67) 
500+ 0.17347 0.12141 0.15717 0.11071 
  (22.44) (5.99) (15.03) (3.87) 
City size (Reference: 0-10.000 inh.)         
10.001-100.000 0.00488 -0.00622 0.00685 0.03591 
  (0.75) (0.44) (0.71) (1.53) 
100.000 +  0.00087 -0.04191 0.02012 -0.00688 
  (0.11) (2.65) (1.96) (0.28) 
Fed. state (Reference: Burgenland)         
Carinthia 0.04491 0.02498 0.00786 0.04371 
  (3.58) (0.54) (0.44) (0.68) 
Lower Austria 0.05664 0.04301 0.05920 0.10444 
  (4.64) (1.00) (3.43) (1.76) 
Upper Austria 0.09363 0.07282 0.05379 0.09711 
  (7.94) (1.70) (3.14) (1.68) 
Salzburg 0.08832 0.05653 0.07420 0.11297 
  (7.15) (1.31) (4.27) (1.95) 
Styria 0.04886 0.03274 0.01198 0.09672 
  (4.07) (0.71) (0.71) (1.49) 
Tyrol 0.06470 0.06337 0.07012 0.13454 
  (5.30) (1.47) (4.04) (2.32) 
Vorarlberg 0.17770 0.14051 0.12591 0.17796 
  (13.91) (3.32) (6.87) (3.12) 
Vienna 0.11074 0.07329 0.13770 0.15822 
  (8.74) (1.69) (7.92) (2.74) 
Number of children (Reference: zero)         
1 child -0.00757 -0.00824 -0.02336 -0.05371 
  (1.23) (0.48) (2.85) (2.49) 
2 children  0.00748 0.00011 -0.04012 -0.07486 
  (1.16) (0.01) (4.11) (3.32) 
3 children + -0.00990 -0.04431 -0.04810 -0.10883 
  (1.12) (2.32) (3.10) (3.38) 
     
Constant 1.10463 1.32826 0.81913 1.14359 
  (45.00) (21.79) (24.08) (12.94) 
          
Adjusted R2 0.3617 0.2924 0.42650 0.30330 
N 11,140 1,869 5,113 913 
Note: dependent variable: gross hourly wage (log, italic numbers in brackets t-statistics 
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Table 5: Wage equation: natives vs. immigrants, specification II 
 
Men Women 
 
Natives Immigrants Natives Immigrants 
Education 0.02553 0.01358 0.03522 0.01957 
  (16.02) (4.46) (17.01) (4.94) 
Tenure 0.00607 0.01023 0.00520 0.00700 
  (7.77) (4.66) (4.17) (2.21) 
Tenure2 -0.00003 -0.00011 0.00005 0.00003 
  (1.12) (1.34) (1.29) (0.31) 
Experience 0.01495 0.01206 0.01743 0.01473 
  (14.43) (4.72) (13.28) (4.49) 
Experience2 -0.00025 -0.00029 -0.00031 -0.00032 
  (10.25) (4.96) (9.67) (4.32) 
Employment in Austria (5 years) 0.24261 0.14989 0.19260 0.05560 
  (15.26) (4.92) (10.33) (1.45) 
Single -0.03492 -0.00256 0.01203 0.02450 
  (6.18) (0.16) (1.86) (1.47) 
White-collar worker 0.08140 0.03687 0.06313 0.04269 
  (12.35) (2.16) (4.93) (1.49) 
Number of children (Reference: zero)         
1 child -0.00471 -0.00859 -0.02005 -0.05827 
  (0.85) (0.56) (2.76) (3.15) 
2 children  0.00981 0.00917 -0.03438 -0.04816 
  (1.68) (0.62) (3.97) (2.50) 
3 children + 0.00246 -0.02810 -0.04515 -0.06661 
  (0.31) (1.65) (3.27) (2.41) 
Firm size (Reference: 0-9)         
10-19 0.04408 0.05160 0.05748 0.02728 
  (4.94) (2.38) (4.59) (0.80) 
20-49 0.06918 0.05024 0.07558 0.02590 
  (9.17) (2.66) (6.92) (0.92) 
50-499 0.11542 0.08954 0.11278 0.00522 
  (18.01) (5.47) (12.74) (0.22) 
500+ 0.16940 0.11799 0.13957 0.04652 
  (23.51) (6.39) (14.36) (1.81) 
City size (Reference: 0-10.000 inh.)         
10.001-100.000 -0.00318 -0.00299 -0.01108 0.03646 
  (0.54) (0.24) (1.29) (1.82) 
100.000 +  -0.00314 -0.02656 0.01118 0.00090 
  (0.45) (1.88) (1.23) (0.04) 
Fed. state (Reference: Burgenland)         
Carinthia 0.03742 -0.00229 0.00678 0.04640 
  (3.29) (0.06) (0.43) (0.84) 
Lower Austria 0.04508 0.01383 0.03835 0.06342 
  (4.07) (0.36) (2.51) (1.25) 
Upper Austria 0.07315 0.03924 0.04423 0.07671 
  (6.82) (1.03) (2.91) (1.55) 
Salzburg 0.06212 0.04863 0.04263 0.12149 
  (5.53) (1.27) (2.76) (2.45) 
Styria 0.03822 0.00542 0.00991 0.08237 
  (3.50) (0.13) (0.66) (1.47) 
Tyrol 0.05529 0.04758 0.06286 0.13941 
  (4.99) (1.25) (4.09) (2.80) 
Vorarlberg 0.12668 0.09671 0.09975 0.12287 
  (10.88) (2.57) (6.13) (2.51) 
Vienna 0.08052 0.05017 0.09367 0.13627 
  (6.99) (1.30) (6.05) (2.76) 
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Table 5Table 5 continued: Wage equation: natives vs. immigrants, specification II 
 Men Women 
 Natives Immigrants Natives Immigrants 
Industry (Ref.: Primary production*)       
Manufacturing -0.03934 0.05116 -0.00927 -0.17417 
  (3.28) (1.27) (0.35) (2.49) 
Construction -0.05075 0.03412 0.01345 -0.15780 
  (3.96) (0.83) (0.44) (1.63) 
Trade -0.12675 -0.02020 -0.09150 -0.27534 
  (10.07) (0.49) (3.50) (3.90) 
Tourism -0.22954 -0.19078 -0.15895 -0.39809 
  (10.85) (4.00) (5.54) (5.58) 
Business services -0.10755 -0.01502 -0.01729 -0.27059 
  (8.65) (0.37) (0.66) (3.81) 
Public services -0.17216 -0.03301 -0.05689 -0.20884 
  (12.81) (0.73) (2.18) (2.94) 
Other services -0.12201 -0.10399 -0.09764 -0.31609 
  (7.65) (2.11) (3.43) (4.21) 
Occupation (Reference: Managers)         
Professionals 0.01049 0.02440 -0.02454 -0.09519 
  (0.93) (0.73) (1.23) (1.88) 
Technicians -0.01054 -0.02839 -0.01826 -0.09541 
  (1.26) (0.97) (1.16) (2.36) 
Clerks -0.03647 -0.06242 -0.03716 -0.11518 
  (3.58) (1.72) (2.33) (2.73) 
Service workers -0.13618 -0.17061 -0.15395 -0.25005 
  (10.44) (4.52) (9.13) (6.00) 
Agricultural workers -0.20143 -0.11444 -0.21728 -0.57883 
  (7.81) (1.56) (5.52) (4.32) 
Craft -0.05788 -0.07156 -0.17320 -0.24624 
  (5.93) (2.21) (6.73) (4.48) 
Operators -0.10047 -0.09245 -0.09841 -0.15717 
  (8.95) (2.75) (3.56) (3.05) 
Elementary occupations -0.09745 -0.08751 -0.12981 -0.20684 
  (7.82) (2.63) (5.96) (4.70) 
Job position (Ref.:Un-skilled)         
Low-skilled 0.04218 0.05306 0.04762 0.05859 
  (3.21) (3.57) (2.80) (2.76) 
Medium-skilled 0.10797 0.11341 0.12726 0.13085 
  (7.89) (6.17) (6.97) (4.04) 
High-skilled 0.17371 0.24236 0.20058 0.21630 
  (11.71) (8.59) (10.12) (4.99) 
Advanced/leading 0.17971 0.27524 0.25385 0.25491 
  (11.60) (8.99) (12.16) (5.75) 
     
Constant 1.46964 1.68554 1.21028 1.81860 
  (45.29) (21.67) (24.73) (15.85) 
          
Adjusted R2 0.47710 0.44850 0.55250 0.50550 
N 11,137 1,867 5,110 913 
Note: dependent variable: gross hourly wage (log), italic numbers in brackets: t-statistics 
*primary production = agriculture, forestry, mining and the energy sector 
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5. Conclusions 
In this paper we analyze wage discrimination against immigrants in Austria. We match data 
from the micro-census and social security records to provide new evidence for Austria. We 
find a raw wage gap of immigrants of approximately 15 log percentage points. Results from 
Oaxaca/Blinder decomposition show that 10 to 30 percent of this wage gap can be explained 
by differences in endowment of human capital. Controlling for occupation and in particular for 
job position reduces the discrimination component considerably. In this case, the 
unexplained part of the wage gap amounts to 3 to 5 log percentage points. Overall, the 
unexplained wage gap of immigrants is small, according to the principle `equal pay for equal 
work´. However, one should note that controlling for occupation and job position is justified 
only if the selection with respect to occupation and job position depends on productivity 
relevant characteristics only (e.g. transferability of human capital acquired abroad, language 
skills). Otherwise the degree of discrimination is clearly underestimated. Overall our results 
for Austria are in line with evidence from other European countries, e.g. Germany. In contrast 
to the study of Grandner and Gstach (2014) we find a lower raw wage differential for Austria, 
especially in the lower part of the income distribution. According to our results wage 
discrimination against immigrants is somewhat lower, in particular when we control for job 
characteristics. In accordance with Grandner and Gstach we find that discrimination is 
stronger in the upper part of the wage distribution. Furthermore, the unexplained gender 
wage gap reported by Böheim et al. (2013) for Austria is considerably higher as our 
estimates for the wage gap between natives and immigrants. 
We differentiate between first and second generation immigrants. Our results show no 
evidence for discrimination of second generation immigrants. Furthermore, we use quantile 
regressions to investigate the wage gap across the wage distribution. We find evidence for 
higher wage gaps and more discrimination at the upper part of the income distribution.  
Overall we find some evidence showing problems for immigrants to transfer their human 
capital acquired abroad. Immigrants are very often found in unfavorable job positions. The 
data show no evidence for wage assimilation. Measures for a better integration of foreign 
workers in the Austrian labor market are desirable. While our data are so far the best 
available in Austria for such a purpose, some caveats remain: We have no information on 
language skills which could be an important factor for the success on the labor market. In 
future research we plan to investigate discrimination for special migrant groups (e.g. 
immigrants from (ex-) Yugoslavia, Turkey). 
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